Unrequited reading

Sorry to be writing less frequently, dear readers. I’m in the midst of a work-crunch of monumental proportions. Gotta finish a giant issue of the magazine by next Wednesday, then help put on our annual conference & exhibition Thursday and Friday, then get on a plane Saturday for a chemical ingredient conference. On the doubleplusgood side, said ingredient conference is in Paris, and my wife’s coming along for the trip.

On the down side, the book I just started, Witold Rybczynski’s City Life, is boring me silly, so I may have to drop it. I enjoy WR’s architecture articles on Slate, but the first 50 pages of this book have been pretty dull and pedantic, especially the second chapter’s extended take on how population size does not say much about the importance of a city. Again and again.

Fortunately, Amazon is about to deliver my copy of Shakespeare Wars, the new book from Ron Rosenbaum. Unfortunately, I don’t want to carry a 640-page hardcover with me overseas. So why don’t you suggest a book for me to read, already?

Outta touch

Sorry it’s been a quiet week, dear readers. I’ve been busy at work, but I’ve also found myself falling into one of my wheels-within-wheels paranoiac phases. It’s centered on trying to get at an understanding of the power-relations at play in the current Gulf War.

Anyway, I gotta write an article on the benefits of RFID in the pharma supply chain, so I’m gonna get to that.

I leave you with the Rev. Sun Myung Moon / sushi axis.

Drug Deal

I know this story about the generic release of Plavix requires some knowledge of how the pharmaceutical industry works, but it’s a really funny tale of corporate manuevering. The CEO of the generic company (Apotex) gives an interview with the Times in which he goofs on Bristol-Myers Squibb and Sanofi-Aventis as a couple of pikers:

Mr. Sherman, in a telephone interview, all but ridiculed his two big rivals, saying they had naïvely agreed to conditions that allowed his company to bring [generic Plavix] to market even though the deal was rejected by regulators.

“I think they acted foolishly in a number of ways,” said Mr. Sherman, a Toronto billionaire who amassed his fortune in the generic drug business.

Mr. Sherman said that he had never expected the American government to approve the deal, but that he had conducted the negotiations in a way to let him push the Apotex drug onto the market.

The twist is that BMS & SA were trying to use a loophole agreement with Apotex to keep generic Plavix off the market till 2011. Instead, the deal got shot down, but its side-provisions give Apotex 5 business days to push its drug into the distribution chain before they can lodge a complaint. So Sherman’s company is trying to get as much as $1 billion in product out before any injunction can stop it.

I know it’s another business article, but you oughtta give it a read, just for Sherman’s incredulous take on the agreement.

And they said I’d never amount to anything

I’m interviewing a pair of companies this morning for an article in my September issue. Their combined 2005 revenues were $126 billion.

One’s a major drug company, the other a major healthcare distributor. Margins are a funny thing: the drug company had around $52 billion in sales, with a cost-of-goods of $8.5 billion, while the distributor had $74 billion in sales, with a cost-of-goods of $70 billion. On the other hand, the drug company’s selling, general, and administrative costs were $17 billion while the distributor’s SGA costs were $2.8 billion.

Reminds me of those differences in R&D costs from a few posts back.

Today’s post is brought to you by the letters R and D

BusinessWeek has an essay about the lack of innovation at the major telephone companies (yet another installment in the “I care about this stuff; no reason for you to” series). Mind-blowing quote:

One way in which these companies are very different from the old phone monopoly is that while the original AT&T had a world-class research operation, its successors don’t. One of the signal facts of the communications revolution is that virtually all the new technologies that made it possible were developed outside the phone world. Last year, Verizon’s revenue came in at nearly $80 billion. AT&T (without BellSouth or Cingular) had revenue of $44 billion. And yet while Intel Corp. spent $5.1 billion last year on research and development, AT&T spent just $130 million. The word “research” doesn’t even appear in Verizon’s annual report.

Now, in the pharma industry, there’s a lot of talk about “rethinking R&D,” as major companies learned that simply pumping more dollars into the process doesn’t necessarily yield results. When I compiled this year’s Top Pharma Companies report, I noticed that plenty of big guns have reduced their R&D budgets — not drastically, but it was certainly a change from past double-digit increases. And these annual R&D figures were at least $1 billion for the top 17 companies on the list.

Obviously, the drug industry is keyed by development of new products; patent terms dictate that every product has a brief lifespan. When the R&D pipeline falls short, companies turn to in-licensing new drugs. In my many Yankees = Pfizer comments, this equates to buying free agents when the farm system isn’t producing good players.

Turns out that this is the main model for the telcos.

There is something to be said for “buying it elsewhere.” If the big telcos built everything themselves, there would be no Cisco and no Motorola. But years of buying it elsewhere has yielded a culture distrustful of technology — and of progress: It’s impossible to imagine Microsoft developing a big new product and having the lead engineer shift from foot to foot in the corner pretending to be just another customer. It has meant, as with AT&T’s Lightspeed, that telcos are likely to offer services that only match, but not surpass, those available from others. And increasingly their approach has put the telcos on the wrong side of technological innovation, leaving them in the position of protecting their investments in their networks from the encroachments of new ideas.

Anyway, I’m fascinated by the ways major industries function, and this essay provides some neat insights into what it’s like to be an $80 billion player with razr-thin (ha-ha) profit margins. So give it a read.

The Hit Factory

Since I’ve been writing about the drug industry (our magazine bowed in October 1999) I’ve been hearing that we’re heading toward The Era of Personalized Medicine. This means that, as we develop more knowledge of the genome, proteome, and metabolome (you think I’m making this stuff up?), drugs will be tailored to generate greater efficacy or fewer side effects in smaller population groups.

The drug that gets touted as the advance guard in this wave is Herceptin, which can be very effective in treating breast cancer, but only in tumors that over-express the HER2 protein. Around 20% of breast cancer cases fall into this category; Herceptin isn’t effective against other tumors.

Some pharmacoeconomists contend that personalized medicine will lead to The End of the Blockbusters, as smaller patient groups translate to a cap on your “customer” base. On the other side of the spectrum is a “mass appeal” drug like Lipitor, the cholesterol treatment that sells more than twice the dollar amount of any other drug in the world and is now being tested for benefits in treating Alzheimer’s disease.

I bring this up not because I just finished that Top Companies report, but because of N’Sync.

This morning, I read a funny article adapted from the book The Long Tail by Chris Anderson (not this guy). It examines how the entertainment industry faces The Death of the Blockbuster, citing diminishing CD and movie sales figures and TV and radio ratings as indicators that the niche is where it’s at.

It’s altogether possible that NSync’s first-week record [2.4 million CDs sold] may never be broken. The band could go down in history [. . .] for marking the peak of the hit bubble — the last bit of manufactured pop to use the 20th century’s fine-tuned marketing machine to its fullest before the gears were stripped and the wheels fell off.

Music itself hasn’t gone out of favor — just the opposite. There has never been a better time to be an artist or a fan, and there has never been more music made or listened to. But the traditional model of marketing and selling music no longer works. The big players in the distribution system — major record labels, retail giants — depend on huge, platinum hits. These days, though, there are not nearly enough of those to support the industry in the style to which it has become accustomed. We are witnessing the end of an era.

His long-term economic arguments and his moralizing (near the end) are bizarrely off-kilter. For one thing, News Corp. owns MySpace. The site may offer massive “niche” opportunities, but it’s going to make cash hand over first for Murdoch & Co., both little (user fees) and big (as a promotional tool for its properties).

For another, in this era where every entertainment option is allegedly losing its hit-making power, Anderson manages to avoid any mention of the Harry Potter books and The Da Vinci Code. Both of these are such impossibly massive hits — despite the fact that more individual titles get published now than ever — that they blow a sizeable hole in the concept that we’re all moving to the margins.

It’s my contention that, while there a whole lot of factors at play in the decline of hits in the last five years, I think the biggest is that almost every blockbuster movie is crap, contemporary pop and dance music is so dull that radio stations needed to be bribed into playing it, and the current generation of TV executives were raised on the awful television of the late 1970s and 1980s.

Hits might not be as big as they once were, but they’re even more important to the entertainment industry now, given the high price of failure. I’m not saying it’s right, as it tends to lead to “safe” committee-designed projects, but in the pharmaceutical business, as in Hollywood, the big hits help defray the costs of a bazillion failures.

(The Agitator has some reflections on Anderson’s book.)

Pf***ed

Sorry for the lack of posts, readers! I’m really busy on the home-stretch of that Top Companies special issue. Gotta finish the final profile today, so’s I can head to the shore tomorrow without worrying about it.

I decided to save the biggest one for last: Pfizer. As you may not care from last year, Pfizer is the biggest of the Big Pharmas, but it’s also got a ton of vulnerabilities, as many of its big sellers are getting hit with patent expirations and generic competitors. Here’s a little bit of this year’s report, just so you know I’m not slacking off from VM for no reason:

In his 2005 letter to shareholders, Pfizer chairman and chief executive officer Hank A. McKinnell, Jr. wrote, “The Pfizer built in the 1990s is fading away as some of our prominent, current medicines lose patent protection. This transformation process—this cycle of renewal—is not unexpected. We have been planning for it for years, understanding that while renewal brings challenges, it also creates numerous opportunities.”

That’s quite an understatement. Last year, we pointed out that many of Pfizer’s top sellers are going to lose patent protection in the next five years. The company got a feel for what’s on the way when epilepsy treatment Neurontin went generic during 2005; the drug’s sales dropped from $2.7 billion to $640 million. Antifungal treatment Diflucan did the same, shedding $445 million in sales.

With $1.3 billion of Bextra sales vaporized in 2005, and Celebrex shedding another $1.6 billion, Pfizer needed to add $6.1 billion in sales last year just to keep pace. That’s more revenue than any of the bottom three companies on our list generated in 2005.

And with Zithromax facing its first full year without U.S. patent protection ($2.0 billion in 2005 sales, after its patent expired in 4Q2005), Zoloft ($3.3 billion) going generic in June 2006, and Norvasc ($4.7 billion, the company’s #2 seller) and Zyrtec ($1.3 billion) set to lose protection in 2007, Pfizer needs to generate huge amounts of new revenues.

It fell short in that mission in 2005, with drug sales falling $2.0 billion in 2005. They’re down $394 million in 1Q2006 (-4%).

Tune in next year to find out if Pfizer manages to recoup sales with Lyrica, Sutent, Chantix, and a million other new drugs!

Till then, back to work. Then play!