David Byrne on the economics of the music industry:
Of course, not everyone is as smart as those nerdy Radiohead boys. Pete Doherty probably should not be handed the steering wheel.
Andrew Wylie on the economics of the literary publishing industry:
Um, it’s a very small business, there’s not that tremendous interest available at any given time, so people are interested competitively in what you have, especially if you’re only looking at quality. If you’re playing a higher-risk game, being in the business of quality is a fairly low-risk game if you do it right. The high-risk game is the commercial end. It’s high-risk for everybody, because if it doesn’t work, there’s a tremendous loss to be made—a loss of face, a loss of money. With work of quality, if you don’t make your money back right away, you will over time anyway. So I think we’re the soft and gentle side of the business. We’re the affordable shop in the industry. What we’re selling is going to earn out sooner or later, anyway.
Michael Lewis (a prof at WashU) on the economics of baseball:
The problem is that the teams receiving [revenue-sharing] payments have come to use them as a primary source of income — rather than to build winning teams. The most extreme example has been the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. In 2006, this team had a payroll of about $35 million, $42 million less than the 2006 league average. Not surprisingly, it won only 38 percent of its games and filled less than 40 percent of its seats for home games. It also collected more than $30 million in revenue-sharing transfers. This past season, the team reduced its payroll to $24 million and had about the same level of success. [. . .] The problem is that transfers are based on local revenues. Teams that receive money are encouraged to invest it in their payrolls. But if a team actually attracts fans by fielding a winning team, its revenue-sharing receipts will be reduced.