I recently read When Genius Failed
Once the bottom fell out, the Fed had to coordinate a bailout of LTCM by the world’s leading banks. Many of these banks were treated as doormats by LTCM during its meteoric rise. Trust me; it’s a really entertaining story that Mr. Lowenstein tells. As David Pflug, Chase’s head of global credit, put it, “You can overintellectualize those Greek letters [in LTCM’s formulae]. One Greek word that ought to be in there is hubris.”
Two major issues — beyond the failures of “risk management” — struck me while I read the book. For one thing, LTCM’s collapse was precipitated by a series of regional financial crises in 1997-98. The final straw came when Russia defaulted on its foreign bonds in order to pay workers at home. This means, “Russia welched on its worldwide obligations because it barely had money to keep its government afloat.” And this occurred only ten years ago. So if oil futures didn’t rise 1000% in the past few years, how brazen would Russia be right now? (and if they drop significantly, where will Russia end up?)
The third issue was that the behavior of LTCM and the major banks sounded remarkably familiar to our current mortgage-driven crisis (right down to Lehmann Bros. suffering rumors about its underfunding and impending collapse). The exotic derivatives, the incalculable, illiquid assets, the “too big to fail” mentality: this could be 1998 writ large! Had these financial genii — and many of the major players involved in the recent Bear Stearns collapse also figure into When Genius Fails — managed to ignore every lesson from LTCM’s failure?
Near the end of the book, Mr. Lowenstein wrote:
Permitting such losses to occur is what deters most people and institutions from taking imprudent risks. Now especially, after a decade of prosperity and buoyant financial markets, a reminder that foolishness carries a price would be no bad thing. Will investors in the next problem-child-to-be, having been lulled by the soft landing engineered for Long-Term, be counting on the Fed, too? On balance, the Fed’s decision to get involved — though understandable given the panicky condition of September 1998 — regrettably squandered a choice opportunity to send the markets a needed dose of discipline.
That’s why I was really gratified to open today’s NYTimes and discover that Mr. Lowenstein has a great essay on exactly that topic, “Long-Term Capital: It’s a Short-Term Memory”! He does a good job of explaining the issues without getting overly technical (one of the complaints others have had about his book).
Give it a read; I bet you’ll dig it. (And get irate, when you start reading about the Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac seizure. . .)